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The Problem 
 
Use of and exposure to hazardous substances increased considerably after the Industrial Revolution, 
particularly as the synthetic chemical industry expanded after 1870.  By 1950, a broad range of hazardous 
substances – including lead-based additives to paints and motor fuel, mercury emissions from industrial 
processes, pesticides, strong acids, and chlorides – were widely used in everyday products.  Additional 
hazards were created in subsequent decades as a wider range of plastics and other types of synthetic 
chemicals were invented and used in products or manufacturing processes.  The manufacture and use of 
these substances also created the parallel problem of handling hazardous wastes – the gaseous, liquid, or 
solid residues created in production processes or left over after consumers were finished using a product 
containing them.  For most of human history burning or dumping wastes posed few environmental, safety, 
or health problems.  Few pre-industrial wastes caused harmful smoke when burned, and only a small 
portion of dumped waste was persistent (remaining in the same physical form for an extended period rather 
than decomposing on contact with ground, water, or air).  Many of the new synthetic wastes are quite 
persistent.  A significant portion are also corrosive, explosive unless handled carefully, or poisonous (toxic) 
to humans, animals, or plants.  The worst toxins are those that add bioaccumulation and/or bioamplification 
to persistence.  Substances bioaccumulate, by lodging in the fatty tissue of humans or animals rather than 
being eliminated through sweat or digestion; they bioamplify if they form in stronger concentrations as 
humans or animals higher in the food chain eat plants or smaller animals having the substance in their 
bodies. 
 
The seriousness of hazardous substances problems was acknowledged at the United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) in 1972.  Principle 6 of the Conference Declaration 
stated that 
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 “The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and the release of heat, in such 
quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless 
must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible damage is not inflicted upon 
ecosystems.”  Principle 7 indicated that governments should “take all possible steps” to prevent 
pollution of the seas by substances hazardous to the marine environment or human health.  
Several of the Stockholm Action Plan’s 109 Recommendations stressed the need for increased 
domestic action and intensified international cooperation and research on hazardous substances.1 
The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Conference) addressed hazardous 
substances in very general terms.  Principle 14 reflected the strong developing country interest in 
preventing the spread of hazards in specifying “States should effectively cooperate to discourage or 
prevent the relocation and transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe 
environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.”  Principle 15 embodied a widely 
supported version of the Precautionary Principle without using that term in specifying “In order to protect 
the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”2  
Paragraph 22 of the Plan of Implementation approved at the World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(Johannesburg Summit) in 2002 made the clearest statement about hazardous substances.  It stressed the 
urgency of developing sustainable production and consumption patterns that will “prevent and minimize 
waste and maximize reuse, recycling and use of environmentally friendly alternative materials.”  Paragraph 
23 recorded commitments to “promote reduction of the risks posed by heavy metals that are harmful to 
human health and the environment” and that all chemicals should be “used and produced in ways that lead 
to the minimization of significant adverse effects on human health and the environment” no later than the 
year 2020.3 
 
Efforts to regulate use and disposal of hazardous substances have been hobbled by the lack of agreement 
on which substances should be classified as "toxic" or "hazardous," particularly in the area of waste 
disposal.  This is reflected in Article 1 of the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, which defines “hazardous wastes” as: 
 
a.) Wastes that belong to any category contained in Annex I, unless they do not possess any of 
the characteristics contained in Annex III; and 
 
b.) Wastes that are not covered under paragraph (a) but are defined as, or are considered to be, 
hazardous wastes by the domestic legislation of the [state from which it is exported, the state 
into which it is imported, or a state through which it is transported from seller to buyer]. 
                                                 
1Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference).  1972.  Available at    
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503 (accessed 20 Aug. 2010). 
 
2 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Conference).  2002.  Available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163 (accessed 20 Aug 2010). 
 
3 World Summit on Sustainable Development.  2002.  Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development.  
Text available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm (accessed 20 Aug. 2010). 
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The Annex I categories include anything forming part of 18 distinct waste streams (such as wood 
preservatives or organic solvents), or anything containing certain ingredients (such as mercury, arsenic, or 
chlorates).  Annex III lists 14 dangerous characteristics (including explosive, infectious, corrosive, and 
toxic).4  Each industrial country has developed its own list of hazardous wastes, and even scientists cannot 
agree on a single global list because the hazards posed by a particular substance, product made with the 
substance, or waste are often specific to the context of use, re-use or disposal. 
 
Some regulations attempt to address the definitional problem by classifying substances or wastes by 
seriousness of the hazard they pose.  In 1975, the World Health Organization took an initial step with 
pesticides, a clearly distinguishable type of hazardous substance because they are designed to be toxic to 
insects, by dividing them into four classes: Extremely Hazardous (Class 1A) apt to poison humans or 
animals even at very low concentrations, Highly Hazardous (Class 1B), Moderately Hazardous (Class 2) 
and Slightly Hazardous (Class 3).5  Though the actual hazard posed by a particular pesticide may depend 
as much on the particular climatic and other conditions in which it is used as on the chemicals forming its 
active ingredients, the classifications did help focus attention on the most dangerous ones.  Many national 
and local waste management regulations differentiate between high-risk, intermediate-risk, and low-risk 
wastes, and focus most of the effort to control waste generation and disposal on the high-risk wastes.   
National and local regulations also deal with the fact that many hazardous wastes are generated in 
relatively small amounts by a large number of households and small businesses by adopting regulations 
that re-concentrate them by requiring users to separate their hazardous wastes from other wastes for 
special collection and disposal. 
 
Hazardous substances and wastes can be handled in six responsible ways and one irresponsible way.   
The six responsible ways are: 
 
1.) avoiding their production in the first place,  
2.) reducing their production by decreasing need to use them,  
3.) recovering and reusing them for some other purpose,  
4.) recycling them by retrieval for later use,  
5.) breaking them down into non-hazardous substances with heat, catalysts, or other physical 
processes before final disposal, and  
6.) storing them in leakproof containers at sites where they cannot leech out and contaminate 
surrounding areas. 
 
The irresponsible way is designing products and production processes without regard to the hazards of the 
substances involved and dumping wastes from such production or after the product is no longer useful 
wherever one can regardless of how the wastes are handled and whether the site is appropriate. 
 
While many environmentalists and ecological economists regard avoidance as the best choice, it is not 
always attainable with current technology.  Many individual toxic or hazardous substances have useful 
applications for which no good substitutes currently exist.  In addition, the dividing line between safe and 
                                                 
4 Basel Convention, Article 1 and Annexes I and III.  Text available at http://www.basel.int/text/17Jun2010-conv-e.pdf (accessed 
20 Aug. 2010). 
 
5 World Health Organization.  1975. Recommended Classification of Pesticides by Hazard. WHO Chronicle 29: 397-401 (1975). 
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hazardous substances is not always sharp.  Though some substances are consistently safe and others are 
consistently hazardous, many are hazardous or not depending on the concentration in which it is used, the 
length of time humans, animals, or plants are exposed to it, the method by which it is applied, or the 
physical environment in which it is used.6 
 
The next three responsible choices available are summarized in the environmentalist slogan “reduce, 
reuse, recycle.”  The difficulty of complete elimination does not justify failing to explore possibilities of 
reduction.  Reduction might involve using less of the hazardous substance in making a product, 
determining and informing users of the smallest quantity that will suffice for the purpose (such as chemical 
processing, cleaning, or pest reduction) or by recovering them from manufacturing processes before they 
become waste.  Reusing may be difficult since many hazardous wastes are not in forms conducive to 
finding a new use.  Recycling is also difficult because reprocessing hazardous substances can pose severe 
hazards to the health of workers involved and may not yield materials easily used elsewhere.7 
 
The fifth responsible choice becomes relevant with broken or obsolete manufactured goods, and involves 
separating the unwanted items into their hazardous and non-hazardous components, and either reusing or 
disposing of them separately.  This practice is becoming more common as disposing of wastes by dumping 
them into landfills or the ocean has become more restricted.  Almost all dumping of wastes into the sea is 
now banned, and increasing local opposition has made it more difficult to find additional landfill sites. 
  
The sixth responsible action, leakproof containment at a safe site, is very expensive.  A geologically stable, 
secure site away from populations and watersheds has to be found, appropriate leakproof containers 
constructed, wastes put into the containers, the loaded containers brought to the site, and the site 
monitored.  Finding containment sites has become more difficult as more people have become aware of 
hazardous wastes and unwilling to have them stored nearby.  NIMBY (“not in my back yard”) objections are 
no longer the preserve of the wealthy; strong environmental justice movements in the major industrial 
countries have attained considerable success in keeping hazardous wastes away from poorer communities 
as well. 
 
Individuals with scientific or engineering training have been involved dealing with hazardous substances in 
several ways.  Industrial chemists and industrial process engineers develop products and manufacturing 
processes, which may employ hazardous substances, generate hazardous wastes, or both.  Individuals 
with training in chemistry, engineering, and biology help develop and administer national and local 
chemical, product and waste regulations.  Individuals with training in entomology and ecological science 
have been active in developing systems of integrated pest management (IPM) that are designed to limit 
pesticide use by employing pesticides as one element in a broader array of agricultural practices meant to 
reduce pest infestations.  Individuals with training in medicine are involved in developing regulations and in 
documenting the health effects of hazardous substances and wastes for government agencies or for 
advocacy organizations. 
                                                 
6 Freon provides one of the more striking examples of differences in hazard posed by physical environment.  It is stable and non-
reactive on or near the ground, but breaks down in the higher ultraviolet light levels of the stratosphere after which freed chlorine 
atoms break down ozone molecules, thinning the ozone layer. 
 
7 Some basic information about recycling of hazardous wastes is available at Earth911’s information on recycling hazardous 
materials at http://earth911.com/recycling/hazardous/  (accessed 23 Aug 2010); the US Environmental Protection Agency’s 
hazardous waste recycling page at http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/recycling/index.htm (accessed 23 Aug 2010). 
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Emergence of Uneven Regulation 
 
Early efforts to regulate production and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes were hobbled by a 
widely shared perception that responsible actions cost more than irresponsible ones.  This perception 
resulted from a very common baseline effect created because change is always compared to current 
practice.  Prevailing practices regarding hazardous substances in the 1950s and 1960s imposed few 
restrictions on their manufacture or use and allowed for disposal in ordinary landfills or other dumping sites.  
The costs of coping with hazardous wastes were thus externalized – left for others to absorb – while the 
benefits of using or selling them were internalized – captured by the maker or user.  The result was a 
lopsided perception overestimating net benefit (benefit minus cost) because costs were under-stated.  This 
lopsided impression was further intensified by the normal human tendency to pay more attention to 
immediate results than to long-term results.  Because shifts to any of the responsible actions would require 
changes in product design, manufacturing processes, and user routine, all of them were perceived as more 
expensive than irresponsible actions, and resisted for that reason.  
 
Most exceptions to this inertia in favor of current practice resulted from labor movement pressures to limit 
workplace exposures to hazardous substances.  These were very site-specific problems typically featuring 
fairly high concentrations of hazardous materials that quickly produced ill effects.  Individual countries 
began adopting rules about workplace exposures in the late 19th century, and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) began issuing recommendations on reducing workplace exposures immediately after its 
establishment in 1919.  The dangers of exposure to lower concentrations of hazardous substances (apart 
from their presence in air and water pollution) were revealed more slowly, and did not become significant 
public issues until the late 1950s and early 1960s.  Public awareness of the problem grew as the negative 
effects of over-using pesticides and other chemicals and exposures to lower concentrations of hazardous 
waste became more obvious through publicity given to particular accidental poisonings and through widely 
circulated accounts of pesticide hazards.8  Several incidents of mass illness from exposure to chemically 
contaminated food received international attention in the 1950s and 1960s.  Industrial accidents, like the 
massive chemical leaks in Seveso, Italy in July 1976 or Bhopal, India in December 1984, drew attention to 
the hazardous nature of chemical manufacturing processes.  Meanwhile, medical and public health 
researchers identified several chronic health problems caused by exposures to certain hazardous 
substances.  Though public attention was uneven and inconsistent, changes in public perceptions of some 
substances were far-reaching.  DDT went from being the miracle chemical of the agricultural revolution to 
something likely to exterminate all bird life on Earth.  Asbestos went from being a substance critical to the 
Allied war effort in World War II because asbestos coatings increased the fire-resistance of ships, aircraft, 
and tanks to being a substance that should not be used and should even be removed wherever it has been 
applied. Lead-containing additives in paint and gasoline went from being regarded as useful to being 
banned after medical research demonstrated the severe health effects of even low concentrations on 
children’s mental and physical development. 
 
Initial efforts to regulate production and disposal of hazardous substances met with strong resistance from 
industry, partly because complying with regulations was perceived as expensive and partly out from the 
normal inertia that leads human organizations to continuing doing what they have been doing unless there 
is a compelling impetus for change.  Some early changes in liability law tightening standards of liability and 
                                                 
8The British and Australian governments banned arsenic-based pesticides in 1959 and 1961 respectively.  Rachel Carson.  
1962.  Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin) was the most widely circulated warning about the dangers of high pesticide use. 
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increasing the amount of compensation that could be required did create an impetus, but not until notions 
of product lifecycle analysis9 and concepts of “green chemistry”10 were diffused within industry was there an 
internal impetus for significant change. 
 
Governments first approached hazardous substance problems piecemeal by banning or restricting use of 
particular chemicals, but efforts to develop regulations dealing with hazardous substances as a distinct 
class of substances attained some successes in the 1970s.  In the USA the 1972 Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) required registration of such chemicals and provision of data about 
their environmental effects while the 1976 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) classified substances and 
imposed regulations on manufacture and use of the most hazardous.  The European Community (EC)11 
adopted common maximum residue limits for fruits and vegetables in 1976 and broader regulations on 
manufacture and use of chemicals in 1979.  The individual substances inspiring the most widespread and 
intense public fear were the first to be restricted or banned.  Lead-based additives were progressively 
removed from gasoline in the USA in 1978-1995 and in the EU between 1985 and 1995.  Use of asbestos 
was limited in the USA beginning in 1975, and the limits were tightened in the 1990s; both the EU and 
Japan moved to a complete ban in the mid 2000s.  However, these regulatory victories were concentrated 
in the Western industrial countries where governments had ample administrative capacity, and regulatory 
agencies had scientifically-qualified staff able to assess the risks and benefits of various substances and 
developed science-based regulations. 
 
Regulatory change was less prevalent in the Soviet bloc and the developing countries.  Soviet bloc 
governments had ample expertise and administrative capacity, but they did not face the same public 
pressures to regulate.  Neither their planning ministries nor industry managers gave high priority to 
environmental concerns.  However, the full dimensions of the environmental situation in these countries 
were not revealed until after the end of the Cold War.12  Regulatory capacity was far weaker in developing 
countries, lagging even in countries where the government was promoting expansion of the local chemical 
industry.13 
                                                 
9C. T. Hendrickson, L. B. Lave, and H. S. Matthews. 2005. Environmental Life Cycle Assessment of Goods and Services: An 
Input–Output Approach, Resources for the Future Press.  Lifecycle Analysis guidelines are included in the ISP 14000 standards.  
See ISO 14040. 2006. Environmental management – Life cycle assessment – Principles and framework (Geneva: International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and ISO 14044. 2006. Environmental management – Life cycle assessment – 
Requirements and guidelines (Geneva: International Organization for Standardization (ISO). 
 
10  Paul T. Anstas and John Charles Warner.  1998.  Green Chemistry (Oxford: Oxford University Press) was one of the first 
textbooks.  Sara Goodman, “’Green Chemistry’ movement sprouts in colleges, companies,” New York Times 25 May 2009 and 
Emily Laber-Warren, “Green chemistry: Scientists devise new ‘benign by design’ drugs, paints, pesticides and more,” Scientific 
American 28 May 2010 summarize developments over the last 15-20 years. 
 
11 As it was known in the 1970s.  In 1992 it adopted the name European Union (EU).  This case summary uses the name 
prevailing at the time of a particular policy decision or action. 
 
12Compare Marshall I. Goldman.  1972. The Spoils of Progress: Environmental Pollution in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press) with Murray Feshbach.  1995.  Environmental and Health Atlas of Russia  (Moscow: Paims) and Murray Feshbach.  
1995 Ecological Disaster: Cleaning up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime  (New York: Twentieth Century Fund); 
 
13 Indian engineers were concerned about such a lag in the early 1980s, e.g., R.N. Mukherjea, R.N. Bagchi, and S.C. Banerjee, 
“Safety in Indian chemical process industries: A case study,” pp. 919-937  in Report of the 9th International Symposium on the 
Prevention of Occupational Accidents and Diseases in the Chemical Industry.  Lucerne, Switzerland 5-7 June 1984.  Heidelberg: 
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The US and EC regulations included different testing requirements and listed different substances as 
“hazardous.”  Firms manufacturing and selling products only in the USA or only in the EC were not affected 
by these differences; they conformed to the regulations prevailing where they did business.  Companies 
selling in both areas found the differences irksome because they often meant different requirements 
applied to the same substance.  These companies had a strong interest in persuading governments to 
harmonize their regulations and adopt common standards.  Meanwhile, public discussion of hazardous 
substances issues focused far more on how differences in national regulations create strong incentives for 
displacing production and disposal of hazardous substances to countries where regulations and 
administrative capacity were relatively weak.  The first potential displacement, summarized in notions of 
"race to the bottom" and "pollution havens", is that industries whose production processes create the 
highest amounts of pollution will relocate production to countries where regulations are lax, unenforced, or 
both.  Though less of this displacement occurred than environmentalists anticipated, they mobilized 
considerable public support for their arguments that it would be a significant problem.  Industry resistance 
to regulations seemed to confirm the environmentalists’ assumption that the costs of complying with 
production restrictions and pollution controls were a significant factor in the firms’ decisions about where to 
locate productive activity.  However, closer analysis showed pollution-related costs are only one of several 
considerations and often less important than others.14  The most clearly documented examples of cross-
border relocation of pollution-intensive production, like the maquiladora zone on the Mexican side of the 
US-Mexico border, developed in places where the cross-border move did not take the production much 
further from the places where the products would be sold.15  In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the 
“pollution haven” notion was accepted as true by enough environmentalists and members of the general 
public to make it a prominent feature of advocacy on hazardous substances issues. 
 
The other two cross-border displacements involve international trade in goods.  The first trade 
displacement arises whenever countries restrict use of a hazardous substance but do not ban making it.  
Unless a country bans all production of a particular hazardous substance, companies can export some or 
all of their production to other countries.  The hazards of using the substance and the problem of handling 
wastes resulting from its use then occur in the importing country.  The severity of the problem created by 
exports of hazardous substances subject to bans or limits on use in the country of production depend on 
government capacity in the importing country.  Exports to industrial states, where administrative capacity is 
typically ample, pose fewer problems than exports to developing states, where administrative capacity is 
often much weaker.16  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen Industrie, 1984.  However, it became a public issue only after the December 1984 Bhopal 
toxic gas disaster.   
 
14 Such as P. Dicken. 1992.  “International production in a volatile regulatory environment: the influence of national regulatory 
structures on the spatial strategies of transnational corporations," Geoforum 23 (3): 303-316. 
 
15The Mexicans did not accept all the pollution.  US-owned enterprises operating in the zone were required to ship hazardous 
wastes back to the USA for handling.  However, the rule has not been consistently enforced.  Kate O’Neill.  2000.  Waste trading 
among Rich Nations (Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 41. 
 
16 A 1988 survey of government capacity by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization indicated that 40% of developing country 
governments had not adopted national pesticides registration laws and 60% had no information about which pesticides were 
being imported.  FAO, “International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides: Analysis of Responses to the 
Questionnaire by Governments,” FAO Doc. AGP:CG/89/BP.1 (January 1989), p. 6. 
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The “pollution haven" analogy applies with greater accuracy to the other international trade displacement – 
cross-border shipments of hazardous wastes for treatment or disposal in another country.  Waste handling 
choices are strongly affected by the cost of disposal, which is significantly higher in countries where 
regulations are tighter and enforced more effectively.  As the cost of waste disposal rose in major industrial 
countries in the 1980s, it became economically feasible to ship wastes abroad for disposal in places where 
regulations were less strict.  Legal waste shipments increased,17 and perceptions that illegal trade was 
even faster as companies sought to avoid the new waste disposal costs seemed confirmed by publicity 
surrounding particularly egregious cases (noted in the chronology).  Here, too, the character of the 
transnational regulatory problem depends on the relative administrative capacity of the country where the 
shipments are sent. 
 
The differences in average administrative capacity of industrial and developing states meant that 
multilateral efforts to develop common regulations on the production and use of hazardous substances and 
on disposal of hazardous wastes ran along two distinct tracks.  Addressing differences in industrial country 
regulations was perceived as a problem of regulatory harmonization – of getting different governments to 
adopt identical or at least very similar regulations.  In these discussions, environmentalist and industry 
preferences sometimes ran in parallel: companies producing products for sale in multiple markets often 
prefer harmonized regulations to uncoordinated ones because harmonization simplifies their business 
operations.  However, the parallel paths did not converge into a shared view of the best content of 
harmonized regulations.  Environmentalists preferred harmonization on either the strictest set of existing 
national regulations or a new set based on greatest minimization of risks to users and others; companies 
often preferred harmonization on a less demanding set of regulations. 
 
As cross-border transportation of hazardous wastes became an issue in the 1980s, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) became the primary international forum discussing the 
problem for two reasons.  First, its North American and Western European members accounted for the 
largest shares of international trade in pesticides and other hazardous substances.  Second, the USA 
preferred using OECD because EC members were represented individually rather than having the EC 
speak for them all.  The US government prefers having the Europeans negotiating separately so it can offer 
a wider range of individualized deals to other countries and partly to keep negotiations from getting bogged 
down in intra-EU wrangling.  OECD member Japan was less involved in international trade of hazardous 
substances, but strongly concerned about regulating their production and use at home.  Much OECD 
discussion focused on rules for identifying and classifying hazardous wastes and for ensuring their safe 
transportation. 
 
Addressing differences between industrial and developing country regulations ultimately diverged, but 
initially appeared to be following a similar track.  The UN Environmental Programme took up waste issues 
in 1981 and established a working group to address the issue in 1982.  The governments of developing 
countries, strongly encouraged and supported by environmental and development18 groups, sought to 
                                                 
17 The OECD statistics on legal trade cover only OECD member countries, but in the 1980s they were the source of most waste 
exports.  See OECD Environmental Data: Wastes. 
 
18The term “development organizations” denotes non-governmental entities, which engage in advocacy and field programs 
seeking to improve living conditions and income prospects for impoverished communities in developing countries.  The largest, 
such as the UK-Based Oxfam International, operate in many countries; the smallest work in a few localities within a single 
country. 
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transfer the burden of administering regulations on hazardous substances and wastes to the governments 
of industrial countries.  However, they did not always agree on the best way to bring about that result.  
Some preferred bans on exporting selected particularly hazardous substances and all hazardous wastes; 
they typically argued that this was the only way to ensure makers and users of hazardous substances 
would have to internalize their waste disposal and give them incentive to move towards replacement or 
reduction.  Others preferred requiring prior informed consent (PIC).  In a PIC system, the government of a 
country where waste exporters are located would be required to notify the government of a waste importing 
country of the intended exports, and give the government of the country where the importers are located, 
an opportunity to reject the shipment.  Advocates of PIC realized that all governments would need better 
information about the characteristics and hazards produced by various wastes and that some would need 
help developing the administrative capacity to take part in a PIC system, but thought a ban would prevent 
mutually beneficial transactions. 
 
Though the notion of a worldwide ban did not win much support, the related idea of imposing a ban on 
transfers of hazardous wastes from industrial countries to developing countries garnered wide support.  
Resolutions on international transport of wastes adopted in UN forums including the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development, the UN Environmental Programme, and the UN General Assembly,19 endorsed 
PIC systems for industrial country transfers and bans on transferring the most hazardous types of waste 
from industrial to developing countries.  Because developing countries generated relatively few hazardous 
wastes in the 1980s, little attention was given to the question of what rules should govern transfers 
between developing countries.  This permitted dividing transfers into two types: from one industrial country 
to another, or from an industrial country to a developing country, and gave the debates a strong South 
versus North cast.  
 
Bans and PIC systems have different administrative consequences.  A ban concentrates the whole 
administrative burden on states where waste exporters operate.  That state must take all measures to keep 
the exports from occurring by policing outbound shipments.  PIC’s administrative shift burdens in a more 
complicated way.  PIC works properly only when all governments have good information about hazardous 
wastes; without this information informed consent is not possible.  Most of the testing and assessment work 
generating this information is provided by the regulatory agencies in the larger industrial countries; the 
information component of PIC allows all participating countries access to the information for development of 
their own policies.  However, the governments on both sides of a proposed international waste transaction 
have to file notices and the government on the importing side has to decide and communicate their 
decision in a timely fashion.  
 
Addressing the Problem of Uneven Regulation 
 
In any international agreement short of a complete ban on all international shipments of hazardous wastes, 
governments will need to respond to the incentives for private actors created by differences in national 
regulations.  This effort began in the OECD, and continues there, but was also taken up in the global 
negotiations leading to agreement on the Basel Convention in 1989.  
 
                                                 
19 Their most notable success was General Assembly Resolution 37/137, which urged governments to permit export sales of 
chemicals banned at home only when the government of an importing country requests shipments or permits sale of the 
chemical in its territory. 
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OECD Discussions 
 
The OECD typically addresses new issues by convening expert working groups.  Its approach to problems 
of international shipments of hazardous chemicals and wastes was no different.  Pesticides and other 
hazardous substances were discussed in the Chemicals Group, consisting of officials with technical 
backgrounds working in government agencies regulating chemical sales and uses.  Its work relating to 
hazardous chemicals was part of wider efforts to coordinate chemical regulation in OECD member 
countries.  Since most use of chemicals occurred, and three-fourths of world trade in chemicals was 
conducted between OECD countries, industrial country governments and chemical firms regarded it as the 
most logical place to address issues relating to chemicals. 
 
These OECD discussions were never intended to produce a single set of regulations; administrative 
traditions and local perceptions of wastes in the industrial countries were too well established for complete 
convergence.  Yet they did produce three simplifications reducing the scope of differences in national 
regulations:  
 
1.) a common notification form identifying the data needed for government assessment of a 
chemical’s safety that had the effect of partly standardizing different countries’ testing 
requirements,  
 
2.) a rule that OECD members should accept toxicological data developed by other OECD 
members if the testing conformed to the 1981 OECD Guidelines on Good Laboratory Practice, 
and  
 
3.) a set of principles on transfer of confidential industry data between government regulatory 
agencies allowing governments to share the full range of information they possessed while 
providing companies with assurance that foreign competitors would not be able to take unfair 
advantage of it. 
 
The first OECD recommendations on hazardous chemicals appeared in the late 1960s.  These urged 
member governments to eliminate “non-essential” uses of chemicals, promote greater care in pesticide 
use, develop less harmful pesticides, and promote alternative means of pest control.  They gave a boost to 
nascent integrated pest management (IPM) programs suggesting a combination of controlling pests with 
their natural predators whenever possible, using more pest-resistant hybrid seeds, and applying pesticides 
less often in smaller amounts.  In 1973, an OECD recommendation urged reducing environmental releases 
of mercury to the lowest possible levels.20  On the whole, however, the OECD approach exemplified the 
“least common denominator” dynamic of international regulation: guidelines and recommendations typically 
represented what the most reluctant governments were willing to accept at any particular time. 
 
However, there were moments when strong public pressure or initiatives from leading member 
governments having strong environmental concerns shifted the dynamic towards greater regulatory 
ambition.  One of those occurred in 1985 when the OECD recommended that members ban exports of 
                                                 
20 OECD Council.  Recommendation on Measures to Reduce All Man-Made Emissions of Mercury to the Environment.  OECD 
Recommendation C(73)172. 
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hazardous wastes to developing countries.21  Though not accepted immediately by all OECD members, this 
recommendation had significant effect on the course of global negotiations regarding both hazardous 
chemicals and hazardous wastes by legitimizing the notion that different rules might be needed to 
compensate for local conditions in developing countries. 
 
The OECD remains engaged with hazardous substances issues.  Contrary to the often-expressed view that 
globalization creates irresistible pressures for standardizing regulations, differences in national regulations 
styles and in national perceptions of risks remain strong.22  OECD discussions continue to provide a 
significant forum for exchange of views and identification of areas where greater regulatory harmonization 
would be desirable. 
 
UN Discussions 
 
Public awareness in the industrial countries of the problems posed by increasing use of chemicals in and 
exports of wastes to developing countries originated in efforts by a coalition of environmental and 
development groups to expose the hazards of pesticide use in developing countries.  World trade in 
chemicals, including pesticides, increased considerably during the 1970s.  UN trade statistics suggested 
that by 1980 about one-fourth of chemical exports and about one-third of pesticide exports went to buyers 
in developing countries.23  
 
Though pesticide use problems might have been blamed on poor government administration and weak 
agricultural training programs in developing countries, the advocacy coalitions framed the issue as one of 
corporate irresponsibility since a number of the pesticides involved in the poisonings had already been 
banned from the market in leading industrial countries.  Coming in the wake of scandals over deceptive 
marketing of infant formula in developing countries by Nestlé and other multinational corporations, the 
corporate irresponsibility framing was both highly available and highly appealing to the advocacy coalition 
and the segments of Western publics most likely to support their campaigns.  Focusing on major 
corporations also made sense logistically since they were the makers of the products causing harm.  
Persuading or pressuring them into ending production of the worst substances and limiting export of the 
next-worst to countries where they could be used safely would get at the problem directly.  However, major 
corporations had considerable influence with governments and significant portions of the public in Western 
countries never supported as much regulation as environmentalists hoped to impose. 
 
Large environmental organizations like the World Wildlife Fund and Greenpeace got involved, but the most 
prominent NGO actors on hazardous substances issues in the 1980s were the Pesticide Action Network 
(PAN), a coalition of environmental, rural development and consumer organizations based in more than 30 
                                                 
21OECD Council.  1985. International Cooperation Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 20th June 1985, 
Resolution C(85)100. 
 
22 E.g., J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, eds. 1994.  Governing Capitalist Economies: 
Performance and Control of Economic Sectors (New York: Oxford University Press); Albert Weale. 1995.  "The kaleidoscopic 
competition of European environmental regulation" European Business Journal 7(4): 19-25; Kate O’Neill.  2000.  Waste trading 
among Rich Nations (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
 
23 UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) 1981. Trade Statistics; FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) Trade 
Year Book 1979. 
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countries, and a similar Basel Action Network organized to campaign on hazardous waste issues.  In the 
1990s Arctic indigenous peoples’ groups became strong advocates of tighter global regulations on 
persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and heavy metals after publicity about research demonstrating that 
residues of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) had contaminated arctic food supplies enough that individuals 
in Arctic Inuit communities had concentrations of PCBs in their bodies exceeding industrial country safety 
standards.24  While many of the peope involved in these organizations are activists with liberal arts or policy 
backgrounds, their boards and collaborators also include a significant number of people with training in 
public health, entomology, ecology, and medicine.25  
 
The basic components of a PIC regime for exports of hazardous substances had been suggested by 
environmental groups by the mid-1970s, and some of them were incorporated into national law at the time.  
Japan adopted prior informed consent rules for exports of DDT and BHC.  The USA adopted a notification 
scheme for exports of pesticides banned or severely restricted in the USA.  US companies intending to sell 
those pesticides abroad had to supply governments of importing countries with basic toxicological data 
about the pesticide and to secure from them a written "acknowledgment statement" indicating receipt of the 
data before shipping any of that pesticide to buyers in that country.  However, it did not include provision for 
separate authorization of each shipment-by-shipment authorization as became characteristic of later PIC 
regime.  The Dutch government adopted a more thorough PIC system in 1985.26  Though some observers 
regarded these systems as ineffective, many developing country governments actively sought the 
informational materials, and they helped solidify the idea that prior notification of export activity and 
provision of basic hazard information form the benchmark of good international practice.  The EC was 
slower than individual members to adopt such rules because the EC Commission gave priority to promoting 
harmonization of hazardous substance regulations among its own members, but did adopt an export 
notification scheme in 1986. 
 
Yet, neither individually nor together did these national schemes provide global coverage of hazardous 
chemicals.  The differences in national regulations meant the export notification schemes applied to a 
different set of chemicals and pesticides.  Nor did the sum of their coverage include all of the chemicals or 
pesticides inspiring concern among environmental activists because their definitions of hazard were 
typically more wide-ranging than those used by national regulators.  Since export notification applied only to 
hazardous substances banned or severely restricted in the country of origin, differences in national risk 
assessment procedures and benchmarks were also revealed more clearly.27  Many developing country 
                                                 
24See, for example, Eric Dawailly, Albert Nantel, Jean-Pierre Weber, and Francois Meyer. 1989.  “High levels of PCBs in breast 
milk of Inuit women from Acrtic Quebec,” Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology 43(5): 641-646. 
  
25 Many NGOs post information about their leaders’ backgrounds on their websites.  In early 2010, three of 12 PAN-North 
America board members had scientific training; while PAN-UK’s national projects officer was a PhD cancer researcher, its 
international projects officer was trained in entomology and one of its seven board members held a PhD in public health; the 
president of PAN-Philippines was a professor of pharmacology and toxicology at the University of the Philippines.  See 
www.panna.org for the North American information; www.pan-uk.org for the British information.  Philippine information from 
internet search of the person’s name. 
 
26 Marc Pallemaerts 1988.  “Developments in international pesticide regulation,” Environmental Policy and Law 18(3): 62-69, note 
1. 
 
27 A descriptive summary of the differences prevailing in the early 1990s is provided in United States General Accounting Office 
(GAO). 1993.  A Comparative Study of Industrial Nations’ Regulatory Systems.  GAO/PEMD-94-17. 
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governments were persuaded by transnational environmentalist and development advocacy coalitions that 
the only effective way to deal with regulatory unevenness was to develop a common global PIC regime. 
 
The task of developing global rules and the problem of identifying which hazardous substances should be 
included in a global PIC regime could have been taken up by any of several UN agencies, including the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO).  However, member 
government interest and organizational entrepreneurship concentrated activity in two – the UN 
Environmental Program (UNEP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
 
FAO had more experience in pesticides because it had been dealing with issues of pesticides in agricultural 
use for many years.  Disseminating information about pesticides and their uses forms a prominent part of 
FAO field activity.  FAO experts working in collaboration with experts from the World Health Organization 
(WHO) also formulate standards for food safety in the FAO-WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission.  The 
Commission is composed of government-appointed experts in food safety matters, sometimes drawn from 
government agencies and sometimes from universities or research institutes.  It produces the Codex 
Alimentarius, a compilation of recommended best practices and rules governments can use for guidance in 
developing their own food safety regulations.  A subcommittee, the Committee on Pesticide Residues, 
assists the Codex Commission by developing recommendations regarding acceptable levels of pesticide 
residues in food.  It also consists of government-appointed experts and also draws on evaluations of 
individual pesticides or chemical formulations of pesticides provided by scientists on the WHO and FAO 
staffs who are members of the Joint Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR).  While the JMPR is respected 
by experts and advocacy groups alike, many environmentalists believe the Committee on Pesticide 
Residues often puts industrial interests ahead of health or environment by tending to use the higher 
estimates of “tolerable risk” as the basis for its recommendations. 
 
UNEP quickly became the favorite forum of environmental advocacy coalitions and the Group of 77 
developing countries.  It was new to the field, headquartered in Nairobi, and viewed as receptive to Group 
of 77 concerns.  In addition, FAO was perceived as too closely tied to the agrochemical industry.  However, 
UNEP had little experience with regulating chemicals and pesticides other than helping promote the 
Geneva-based International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC) in the 1970s.  IRPTC was 
intended to provide an information clearinghouse maintaining central files on any chemical, including 
pesticides, known to be or identified as likely to be toxic and to share information about them with national 
governments through “national correspondents.” 
 
Publicity about the risks of pesticides to both agricultural workers applying them in fields and to consumers 
eating foods from sprayed areas started to increase in the 1960s.  In 1973, the WHO published estimates 
indicating about half of the roughly 500,000 cases of accidental poisonings from pesticides were occurring 
in developing countries,28 a striking finding since far less than half of global use occurred in those countries.  
At the time, however, the issue was overshadowed by rising concern about an impending world food crisis 
stemming from widespread droughts in Africa, failures of Soviet wheat crops, increasing populations, and 
stagnating agricultural yields.  The UN’s 1974 World Food Conference devoted considerable attention to 
ideas for increasing crop yields, with pesticides figuring as an important element of the solution because 
                                                 
28 WHO.  1973.  “Safe Use of Pesticides.”  20th Report of the WHO Expert Committee on Insecticides.  WHO Technical Report 
Series, No. 513. 
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pests were thought to consume some 35% of potential crop yield in developing countries.29  Not until 
concerns about food scarcity receded later in the 1970s was the way opened for advocacy groups to gain 
wider attention to pesticide safety. 
 
This campaign intersected with developing country government irritation about continued exports of 
chemicals, particularly pesticides, banned in the country where the manufacturer was based.  The unhappy 
governments brought the issue to the UNEP Governing Council, where they held a majority of the votes.  In 
1977, they succeeded in adopting a Governing Council resolution affirming that hazardous chemicals 
should not be exported without the “consent” of the government of the importing country despite strong 
industrial country opposition.30  The Reagan administration’s 1981 decision to revoke the Carter executive 
order on prior consultations before export of hazardous chemicals triggered a new round of 
environmentalist and development organization campaigning.  This created momentum for UN General 
Assembly adoption of a resolution endorsing the idea of express government consent to imports of 
chemicals banned in the country of manufacture.31  The Pesticide Action Network rallied the European 
Parliament to a resolution calling on the EC Commission to adopt prior informed consent in October 1983.32  
 
Concerns about other hazardous chemicals and about hazardous wastes were rising at the same time.  
Both advocacy coalition campaigns and intergovernmental negotiations proceeded with awareness of the 
similarities between the three issues, but typically divided consideration into distinct pesticides/chemicals 
and hazardous wastes negotiations.  The primary reason for this separation was economic: pesticides and 
hazardous chemicals have a wider set of willing buyers desiring to put them to particular uses.  In 2001, the 
OECD estimated that trade in chemicals of all types other than pharmaceuticals constituted about 10% of 
all international trade, and projected that even with rising concern about chemical hazards, total chemical 
output would need to increase by 85% to meet the level of demand projected to exist in 2020.33  Even DDT, 
abhorred by environmentalists and the general public in many countries, is still used in countries where 
other chemical pesticides are not sufficiently effective against malaria-carrying mosquitoes. 
 
UNEP discussions of the chemicals and pesticides issued in the early 1980s was focused on a Working 
Group of Experts given the task of drafting Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Potentially 
Harmful Chemicals, in Particular Pesticides, and in International Trade.  The Group of 77 wanted the 
working group to adopt shipment-by-shipment PIC requirements, but industrial countries rallied around a 
counter proposal for a "provisional notification scheme" based on the OECD Guiding Principles on 
Chemicals Trade.34  The OECD principles involved information exchange and a one-time notification of 
                                                 
29World Food Conference Final Report, available at http://www.eclac.cl/cumbres/3/43/FAORLC-
41001WorldFoodConference.doc.  A summary of discussions is provided at http://archives-
trim.un.org/webdrawer/rec/425712/view/Items-in-World%20Food%20Conference%201974.PDF. 
 
30 Governing Council Resolution.  Report of the Governing Council on the Work of its Fifth Session, UN Doc. A/35/25 (1977). 
 
31 General Assembly Resolution 37/137 of 17 Dec. 1982.  Text available via http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r32.htm  
 
32 Marc Pallemaerts. 1987.  “Export Notification,” European Environmental Review 1 (2): 29. 
 
33 OECD 2001, p. 10. 
 
34Summarized in “OECD Council adopts recommendation on exports of banned, restricted chemicals,” International Environment 
Reporter, 11 April 1984, p. 100. 
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exports.  The logjam broke at the third meeting of the UNEP working group in February 1987.  The OECD 
had accepted prior informed consent in guidelines on hazardous waste in late 1985,35 the Dutch were 
beginning to implement their unilateral prior informed consent scheme, and the Group of 77 made clear it 
was going to use its majority on the Governing Council to insist on including PIC in the proposed UNEP 
guidelines.  Sensing the momentum, officials in the United States Environmental Protection Agency first 
persuaded the US chemical industry to accept PIC and then persuaded a reluctant Reagan administration 
to allow EPA to participate in designing and implementing it.36  The UNEP Governing Council adopted the 
already-written Guidelines (which became known as the London Guidelines) and to instruct the working 
group to develop rules on prior informed consent in time for adoption at its next meeting in May 1989.  With 
this endorsement in hand, advocates of PIC were able to overcome resistance in other intergovernmental 
organizations.  Thus, in the November 1987 FAO Conference, that agency’s highest decision-making body 
agreed by consensus to add PIC to the already-developed FAO Code of Conduct on pesticides. 
In 1987, there was real prospect that two competing global PIC regimes for chemicals, one run by FAO and 
the other by UNEP, would emerge.  The agrochemical industry and developing country agricultural 
ministries would have been much happier cooperating with FAO, and industry actively distrusted UNEP.  
Conversely, the environmental and development NGOs leading the advocacy campaigns distrusted FAO 
and much preferred having UNEP take the leading role.  Although each organization had advantages in 
different areas -- UNEP had been dealing with a wider range of chemicals but FAO had a much stronger 
network of regional and country level contacts particularly with developing country agricultural ministries 
that had more influence than their environment counterparts.  UNEP was aware PIC schemes would focus 
initially on pesticides since pesticide hazards were the most visible issue at the time and that PIC schemes 
for pesticides would require active cooperation from agricultural ministries.  Yet, developing country 
agricultural ministries were strongly interested in maintaining access to pesticides, and not always as 
diligent as local environmental and rural development advocates would have liked in distinguishing 
between the more and less hazardous ones.  More generally, Dutch experience with its unilateral PIC 
scheme was not promising: most of the requests for permission to ship a listed chemical elicited no 
response, leaving chemical firms even more frustrated by the rules.  Thus, there was a real danger that 
having two separate PIC schemes with chemical manufacturers preferring one and environmentalist and 
development advocacy coalitions preferring the other would condemn both to failure. 
 
The UNEP and FAO secretariats were aware of the danger and were anxious to secure cooperation from 
both industry and advocates.  While industry had chosen to pursue partial accommodation by accepting 
voluntary codes of conduct and voluntary notification, industry leaders had made clear their opposition to 
mandatory PIC.  Both secretariats were also aware an earlier WHO-ILO effort to develop an International 
Program on Chemical Safety had failed because of failure to secure industry cooperation.  Working 
together, UNEP and FAO were able to avoid this.  FAO involvement plus active participation in the expert 
groups by members of the US Environmental Protection Agency helped keep industry at the table.  
Meanwhile, the NGO advocacy coalitions were heartened by involvement of UNEP.  Thus by cooperating, 
the two UN agencies were able to get industry and NGOs into the same room and develop a PIC scheme 
                                                 
35OECD Council.  1985.  International Cooperation Concerning Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, 20th June 1985, 
Resolution C(85)100. 
 
36 Robert L. Paarlberg.  1993.  “Managing pesticide use in developing countries,” in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and 
Marc A, Levy, eds. Institutions for the Earth (Cambridge: MIT Press), p. 324. 
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which, although not as restrictive as the NGOs would have liked nor as unrestrictive as the chemical 
industry would have liked, was accepted by both. 
 
UN discussions of hazardous waste issues featured competing proposals for bans and PIC regimes.  Many 
environmentalists supported a global ban on cross-border waste trade.  Industrial country governments 
rejected a global ban.  This sentiment was particularly strong in the European Community because waste-
handling firms in a number of member countries had developed specialized hazardous processing facilities 
waste whose profitability depended on access to larger waste stream than produced in the particular 
country where it is located.  This resistance led some ban advocates to shift to the “fallback position” of 
pressing for a ban on shipments from industrial to developing countries.  The only clear exception to this 
pattern involved radioactive waste.  A combination of fears that “the oceans are dying” and broader anti-
nuclear sentiments helped propel governments to adopt a moratorium on dumping low-level radioactive 
wastes at sea in 1985 and then a comprehensive ban in a 1993 amendment to the London Dumping 
Convention.  Though most scientific reviews indicated the wastes involved would have added only a minute 
amount to the naturally occurring levels of radiation, public dread of anything radioactive – promoted by 
referring to the wastes involved as “radwastes” – prevailed.37 
 
The UN Environmental Programme took the lead on hazardous waste issues in 1982 when its Governing 
Council created a working group to develop policy recommendations for improving hazardous waste 
management.  It recommended international shipments of hazardous waste occur only when a) the 
government of the importing country had been informed of the contents and agreed to the shipment, and b) 
facilities for processing the waste in the importing country were at least as good as those in the exporting 
country.  These recommendations formed the basis of the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the 
Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes adopted by the UNEP Governing Council in 
1987.  Though guidelines, and hence voluntary, support for requiring use of PIC rules was strong enough 
that the Governing Council also initiated discussion of a global treaty to regulate cross-border transport of 
hazardous wastes. 
 
The hazardous wastes discussions were complicated by the continuing vacillation between bans and prior 
informed consent.  Greenpeace led the environmentalist advocacy of a complete ban.  A complete ban 
could be supported by ecological claims that it would encourage better waste management everywhere by 
forcing countries to deal with their own problems (“become self-sufficient in waste” as some put it).  
However, many of the arguments in the late 1980s highlighted the South-North dimension instead in claims 
that a complete ban was the only way to stop “toxic imperialism.”  Yet, the OECD had addressed concern in 
1985 by recommending that members ban transfers of hazardous wastes to developing countries.  In the 
UNEP negotiations industrial state governments argued for adopting a PIC as the general global rule 
instead of a ban, on grounds that regulated waste trade was not only economically desirable but could help 
protect the environment by permitting countries (particularly communities or companies in border regions) 
to share specialized facilities.38 
 
                                                 
37 Lasse Ringius.  2001.  Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
 
38Willy Kempel.  1993.  "Transboundary Movements in Hazardous Wastes" in G. Sjöstedt, ed., International Environmental 
Negotiations. Newbury Park: SAGE Publications, pp. 48-62. 
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The Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal did 
include provisions banning shipments of hazardous wastes to Antarctica and to any state that had adopted 
national laws banning such imports.  All other cross-border shipments were covered by a mandatory PIC 
procedure.  Nor could waste handlers in a state that became a party to the Basel Convention evade the 
PIC requirements by shipping hazardous wastes to importers in a state that is not a party; governments 
agreed to prohibit shipments of wastes to non-participating states unless the exporters and importers 
involved followed rules about notification of shipments and information about hazards as stringent as those 
in the Basel Convention. 
 
Negotiators dealt with the different ways to define hazardous wastes by deferring to national definitions, 
and covered all the possible reasons for shipping wastes elsewhere by defining the term “disposal” to 
include not only incineration or delivery to a disposal site but also activity resulting in “resource recovery, 
recycling, reclamation, direct re-use or alternative uses” of the wastes.  In the 2000s, this provision became 
the basis for multilateral discussions of worker safety regulations in waste recovery industries. 
 
Advocates of bans were more successful in Africa, where governments were persuaded to adopt a ban on 
shipments of hazardous wastes from outside Africa and minimization of shipments within Africa.  Both 
ideas were incorporated into the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control of 
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa in 1991.  Though the 
Bamako Convention came into effect in 1998, the impetus to organize the institutions needed to implement 
it has been weak since governments began taking advantage of the Basel Convention provisions allowing 
governments to declare they would not accept imports of hazardous wastes.  
 
Experience with PIC Regimes 
 
The "voluntary PIC” schemes on chemicals adopted in 1989 – the amendments to the FAO International 
Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides39 and the UNEP Amended London Guidelines40 
on hazardous chemicals – applied to three sets of substances: pesticides, industrial chemicals (chemicals 
used in manufacturing and other commercial activities), and consumer chemicals (chemicals used in 
households).  They did not apply to fertilizers, which do not create hazards when applied properly, or to 
drugs, which were already covered by other legal regimes.  UNEP and FAO agreed to collaborate in 
managing them through a series of Joint Meetings on Prior Informed Consent.   FAO drew on its 
established practices in pesticide assessment to propose that the meetings include an expert forum, the 
Joint Group of Experts on Prior Informed Consent.  The 10 members of the Joint Group of Experts, 5 
appointed by UNEP and 5 by FAO, were selected to serve as individual experts even though most of them 
were employees of a particular government’s regulatory or safety agency.  Though each appointed a 
separate set of experts, the two agencies collaborated to ensure a rough balance between experts from 
developing and from industrial countries.  The experts maintained close contact with both environmental 
groups and industry, but also avoided being overwhelmed by developing rules limiting the number of 
nongovernmental participants to 2 representatives of environmental groups and 2 representatives of 
industry. 
                                                 
39FAO Conference Resolution 10/85, Annex, 28 Nov. 1985 in Report of the 23rd FAO Conference 1985 amended by FAO 
Conference Resolution 6/89 in Report of the 25th FAO Conference 1989. 
 
40UNEP Council Decision 14127 of 17 June 1987; PIC amendment adopted by UNEP Council Decision 15/30 of June 1989. 
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The Joint Group of Experts had two tasks: selecting the chemicals and pesticides that would be subjected 
to PIC requirements, and preparing the Decision Guidance Documents (DGDs) outlining their 
characteristics and risks that governments would use in deciding whether to allow or refuse imports of 
particular chemicals.  In performance of both tasks, the Joint Group consulted with experts in the FAO and 
UNEP secretariats, as well as, private expert consultants. It also secured information about chemicals 
proposed for addition to the PIC list from government regulatory agencies, chemical firms making the 
products, and NGOs possessing relevant information about hazards.  This work began slowly, however, 
because the Joint Expert Group was strongly committed to basing DGDs on strong scientific evidence so 
that the controversies about accuracy of the IRPTC information would not affect the PIC scheme. 
 
Initial efforts to select pesticides and other chemicals for inclusion were guided by elements of the Code of 
Conduct and the Revised London Guidelines.  The Revised London Guidelines specified that chemicals 
(including pesticides) subject to ban or severe restriction in at least five countries would be the priority 
candidates for inclusion in the PIC scheme.  The report of the FAO conference that revised the Code in 
1989 specified that pesticides denied registration for sale in a single country or withdrawn from sale by their 
manufacturer because of health or environmental hazard concerns could also be considered for inclusion in 
the PIC scheme.  However, when the Joint Group began work in 1990, it had little information about 
national regulations.  Few governments had notified the PIC Secretariat of the bans or restrictions 
(“national control actions”) they had adopted.  The IRPTC’s databases were regarded as unreliable, not 
only by industry whose opinions were discounted to some extent by other actors, but also by experts in 
government regulatory agencies because the reporting was unsystematic and inconsistent. 
 
The European Community provided a path out of the confusion by communicating the list of chemicals 
restricted by EC regulation 1734/8841 to the PIC secretariat.  Since the Regulation applied to all 12 EC 
members, the Expert Group suddenly had a list of substances that had been controlled in at least five.   
Though having better scientific basis than the IRTCP lists, the EC list included a larger number of 
chemicals that could be added to the PIC scheme at once. The primary bottleneck in preparation of the 
Decision Guidance Documents (DGDs) that would include the information about toxicity, risks, and safety 
measures was needing to make good decisions about whether to permit imports. 
 
The Joint Meetings provided the Joint Expert Group with a favorable work environment by deferring to its 
judgments regarding which chemicals, and in what order should they be added into the PIC scheme.  This 
gave the experts time to improve considerably on prior international efforts to regulate trade in toxic 
chemicals.  It developed a more precise categorization of “control measures” and designed a new reporting 
form that allowed national regulatory agencies to describe the basis of their decisions to ban or limit sales 
of a particular chemical in a more consistent fashion.  It also secured better data on actual production and 
use of particular chemicals, allowing it to identify which chemicals on national lists were still in production 
and focus attention on them.  On a few occasions this data indicated that chemicals no longer produced in 
leading industrial countries because they had been superseded by others, were still being produced in 
developing countries because of different market conditions. 
 
                                                 
41 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1734/88 of 16 June 1988 concerning export from and import into the Community of certain 
dangerous chemicals Official Journal L 155, 22 June 1988, pp. 2–6  (available via Eur-lex  at http:eur-lex.europa.eu).  
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The Joint Expert Group’s insistence on solid scientific evidence slowed the pace of regulation, but also 
provided a basis for credible, evidence-based recommendations to remove chemicals from the PIC list. 42  
This process helps maintain industry confidence in the process by demonstrating that it is responsive not 
only to new data showing that hazards are greater than initially anticipated but also to new data showing 
that hazards are less than initially anticipated.  The Joint Committee contributed to maintaining this process 
by following Joint Expert Group recommendations on de-listing as well as on listing chemicals. 
 
The Joint Meeting also promoted better use of expertise by taking up one of the more politically and 
economically sensitive issues in chemical regulation.  This is whether PIC requirements should also cover 
pesticides or chemicals that are not severely hazardous when used in industrial countries but pose serious 
hazards when used under conditions typically prevailing in developing countries.  The question is 
complicated by economic and physical considerations.  The economic considerations arise because 
chemical firms believe inclusion of a particular product or chemical ingredient on the PIC list reduces its 
sales and demand strong evidence of significant hazard before listing occurs.  The physical considerations 
arise because the conditions making a chemical more hazardous in developing countries can range from 
climatic differences between temperate and tropical zones, high illiteracy rates among rural workers, 
unavailability of protective clothing and other gear, or even local aversion to certain protective measures 
(such as wearing rubberized coveralls or respirators) because they are very uncomfortable in hot weather.  
This means estimating the risks to workers applying or using the chemicals and to others nearby is more 
complicated than in industrial countries where one may assume workers are literate, have adequate 
supplies of protective clothing and gear, and comply with safety recommendations.43 
 
Though environmental and development NGOs had been campaigning to raise public awareness of risks to 
rural workers in developing countries, the claims rested on anecdotal evidence until publication of David 
Bull’s more systematic survey of use in 1982.44  Yet, Joint Meeting action was delayed because Joint 
Expert Group efforts to develop sufficiently deep technical background were hobbled by the fragmentary 
data available.  Only about one third of the developing countries participating in the voluntary PIC scheme 
replied to a request for information.  Many of these responses did not include information on the numbers of 
poisonings, the number of deaths from poisoning, or on the equally important question of what proportion of 
deaths were suicides rather than accidents.45 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 This was inspired by experience with cyhexatin, a pesticide developed in the late 1980s.  It was subject to PIC rules between 
1990 and 1995 because early studies indicated that it caused birth defects in rabbits.  It was removed when later studies 
disproved those initial findings. 
 
43 The exceptions tend to be localized rather than countrywide. 
 
44David Bull. 1982.  A Growing Problem: Pesticides and the Third World Poor.  Birmingham, UK: OXFAM. 
 
45The distinction is important because no amount of labeling or protective measures can prevent a suicide.  Studies undertaken 
in Panama, Brazil, and Nicaragua suggested that in some areas suicides accounted for 90 to 100% of the deaths.  See David 
Victor. 1998.  “Learning by doing in the chemicals and pesticides trade regime,” in David G Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. 
Skolnikoff, eds The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, p. 268, n. 18. 
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Hazardous Substance Issues Today 
 
Hazardous Substances remain a significant portion of the world’s chemicals and wastes.  National reports 
submitted to the Basel Convention secretariat in 2001 indicate that approximately 8.5 million metric tonnes 
of hazardous waste were shipped across national borders, and that figure does not include illegal trade.46 
 
Though the “voluntary PIC” regimes were replaced by treaty-based “mandatory PIC” when the Basel and 
Rotterdam Conventions took effect, the new PIC systems incorporated methods of identifying chemicals to 
be included and of preparing guidance documents summarizing the nature and extent of hazards posed by 
a particular hazardous chemical, pesticide, or waste.  The Rotterdam Convention’s Chemical Review 
Committee is very similar to the UNEP-FAO Joint Expert Group, except that it includes 31 government-
named experts and operates under a more explicit distribution of members among the seven “PIC 
regions”.47  The Chemical Review Committee is also enjoined to work by consensus whenever possible, 
though may adopt a recommendation by a two-thirds vote if efforts to reach consensus fail.48  This rule can 
make progress slow, particularly in the eyes of activists, if one or a few members hold out.49 
 
The Basel Convention uses a different system, in which individual countries volunteer to act as leader in 
creating a set of technical guidelines regarding safe handling of a particular type of hazardous waste and 
submit these to the Open-Ended Working Group for consideration and recommendation to the Conference 
of the Parties.50 
 
Pressures for developing substitutes or otherwise avoiding use of hazardous substances and for reclaiming 
or recycling hazardous wastes have been increasing.  The 2002 Johannesburg Plan of Implementation 
strongly endorsed eliminating as many hazardous substances as possible and minimizing use when 
avoidance is not feasible.  The Johannesburg Summit also endorsed proposals to adopt a more integrated 
global approach to dealing with hazardous chemicals, which would include increasing developing country 
capacity to deal with hazardous chemicals, disposal of leftover chemicals and pesticides, improving 
publicly-available information about hazardous chemicals, and possibly phasing out certain chemicals.  
This endorsement supported efforts that had begun in the mid-1990s.  In 1994, UNEP, WHO and ILO had 
begun co-sponsoring triennial meetings of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, an expert 
                                                 
46 UNEP.  2006. “Basel Convention at a Glance” available at http://www.basel.int/convention/bc_glance.pdf (accessed 22 
February 2010). 
 
47 Rotterdam Convention, Article 18, Paragraph 6.  The first Conference of the Parties defined the regions as Africa, Asia, 
Europe, Latin America & Caribbean, Near East (includes North Africa and Central Asian states), North America (USA and 
Canada), and Western Pacific (Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific island states). 
 
48The working papers on procedure that guide Chemical Review Committee work are available on the Rotterdam Convention 
website at http://www.pic.int/home.php?type=t&id=209&sid=18 (accessed 24 February 2010). 
 
49 9 African countries banned use of endosulfan in early 2009, triggering its addition to the list of chemicals to be considered for 
inclusion in PIC requirements.  PAN was vocally accusing the government of India of using various unfair tactics to keep the 
scientific committee from recommending a listing.  See PAN News Updates, 26 March 2009 at 
http://www.panna.org/resources/panups/panup_20090326 (accessed 27 Aug 2010). 
 
50 Basel Technical Guidelines available at http://www.basel.int/meetings/sbc/workdoc/techdocs.html (accessed 26 February 
2010). 
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group including industry participants as well as officials from government regulatory agencies.  UNEP 
convened a separate expert group of its own to recommend measures for reducing the risks posed by 
certain hazardous chemicals.  The result was adoption of a global Strategic Approach to International 
Chemicals Management (SAICM) in 2006.  It provides a framework for discussions and exchanges of 
information on best practices among governments, chemical manufacturers, and chemical users.51 
 
Supporters of banning all international trade in hazardous wastes have won significant victories.  At least 
100 governments have used the Basel provision allowing states to prohibit imports to keep anyone from 
exporting hazardous wastes to them.52  Adoption and spreading ratification of the “Ban Amendment,” which 
would prohibit exports of hazardous wastes from industrial countries to developing states has received 
more publicity.  Adopting the amendment required securing support from a majority of the governments 
represented in the Basel Conference of the Parties, entry into force required at least three-fourths of those 
who voted in favor to formally ratify it, a process which requires approval by the national legislature in many 
countries.53  Although the ban amendment was adopted in 1995, disagreements about how to calculate 
whether there are sufficient ratifications to bring it into force currently cloud the situation; ban proponents 
claim it is in effect and ban opponents maintain it is not.54  However, environmental groups strongly support 
it and the EU has adopted it into EU Regulations.  
 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) became the subject of two international agreements, a protocol to the 
Convention on Longrange Transboundary Air Pollution among countries in Europe and North America 
(negotiated in 1998; became effective in 2003), and the globally applicable Stockholm Convention on 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (negotiated in 2001 and became effective in 2004).  The POPs Protocol to 
the LRTAP Convention defined three sets of controls:  elimination of domestic use and production (Annex 
I), restrictions on use (Annex II), and by-products subject to emission limits (Annex III).   
 
The particular substances regulated have been placed in the annexes as follows:55 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51The statement of SAICM organization and goals is available at   
http://www.saicm.org/documents/saicm%20texts/SAICM_publication_ENG.pdf (accessed 26 February 2010). 
 
52 Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie, and Janet Welsh Brown.  2006.  Global Environmental Politics, 4th edition (Boulder: 
Westview Press), p. 131. 
 
53 Basel Convention, Article 17(5).  Ratification is simpler in parliamentary countries where the executive has majority support in 
the legislature; it may be more difficult in presidential countries where the executive and legislative branches are elected 
separately and may be controlled by different parties at a particular moment. 
 
54The dispute turns on counting.  If the 3/4 refers to the current number of parties to the Convention, that would mean 3/4 of 
today’s 174 parties, or 131.  If the 3/4 refers to the number of parties on the date the amendment was adopted, there were 83, 
and 3/4s would be 62.  There are currently 65 ratifications, but about a third of those have came from states that were not parties 
in 1995.  If only states parties in 1995 are counted, 44 have ratified.  See discussion in Henrik Selin.  2010.  Global Governance 
of Hazardous Chemicals (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 76.  
 
55 As listed on the LRTAP Convention site, http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/pops_h1.htm (accessed 19 August 2010). 
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 Annex I Annex II Annex III 
 aldrin 
chlordane 
chlordecone 
DDT 
dieldrin 
endrin 
heptachlor 
hexachlorobenzene 
hexachlorobenzene 
hexabromobiphynl 
mirex 
polychlorinated 
biphenyls (PCBs) 
toxaphene 
DDT 
HCH 
lindane 
PCBs 
dioxins 
furans 
hexachlorobenzene 
polycyclic aromatic 
hydrocarbons 
(PAHs) 
 
Key to chemical type: pesticide    industrial chemical   by-product   
 
 
The Stockholm Convention addresses what are regarded as the nastiest of hazardous chemicals, 
designating some for elimination (Annex A), others for severe restriction (Annex B) and others appearing as 
by-products of production for minimization (or elimination when feasible) (Annex C).  The evolution of the 
annexes provides a tracer of global consensus about what are the worst substances:56 
 
 
 Annex A Annex B Annex C 
original list  aldrin 
chlordane 
dieldrin 
endrin 
heptachlor 
hexachlorobenzene 
mirex 
polychlorinated biphenyls 
toxaphene 
DDT polychlorinated 
     dibenzo-p- 
     dioxins (PCDDs) 
polychlorinated  
     dibnzofurans 
     (PCDFs) 
polychlorinated 
     biphenyls 
     (PCBs) 
hexachlorobenzene 
     (HCB) 
additions 
2009 
chlordecone 
hexabromopiphenyl 
hexabromodiphenyl 
     ether 
heptabromodiphenyl 
perfluorooctane 
     sufonic acid, 
its salts 
perfluorooctane 
     sufonyl fluoride 
pentachlorobenzene 
                                                 
56 Annex lists as given by the Stockholm Convention Secretariat.  See 
http://chm.pops.int/Convention/ThePOPs/tabid/673/language/en-US/Default.aspx (accessed 19 August 2010) 
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     ether 
alpha- and beta- 
hexachlorocyclohexane 
lindane 
pentachlorobenzene 
tetrabromodiphenyl ether 
pantabromodiphenyl ether 
 
 
Key to chemical type:  pesticide    industrial chemical    by-product 
 
 
The enlarged European Union, which in 2006 had 27 member states with a population of 485 million and a 
combined economy about the size of the United States’, emerged as the global leader on limiting 
hazardous wastes after adoption of a Sustainable Development Strategy in 2001 that committed EU 
members to ensuring by 2020 “that chemicals are only produced and used in ways that do not pose 
significant threats to human health and the environment.”  The EU also adopted an Integrated Product 
Policy calling on member countries to reduce resource use and the environmental impact of all types of 
waste.  These broad commitments were converted into specific policy measures in 2003 when the Waste 
Electric and Electronic Equipment Directive (WEEE),57 and the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous 
Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS)58 Directive came into effect.  WEEE requires 
producers to take responsibility for recycling, reprocessing, or safely disposing of all regulated equipment 
and components they make; EU policymakers expect the system to provide strong incentives for designing 
the equipment for more effective disassembly and reprocessing.  It also backstops the Basel Convention by 
banning export of hazardous wastes.  RoHS currently restricts use of four heavy metals (lead, mercury, 
cadmium, and hexavalent chromium [Cr-VI]) and two classes of chemicals (polybrominated biphenyls 
[PBBs] and polybrominated diphenyl ethers [PBDEs].  The maximum allowed concentrations of all these 
substances except cadmium is 0.1% by weight; the maximum allowed cadmium content is 0.01% by 
weight.  The concentration limits pertain to each “ingredient” – every distinct component of a product that 
can be taken apart mechanically (by unbolting, cutting, grinding, etc).  Thus, an appliance covered by a 
plastic case that contains 1,500 parts per million (0.15%) of the flame-retardant PBB violates the RoHS 
standards whatever the size or weight is of the whole appliance. 
 
WEEE and RoHS stirred some opposition from industry, but this was mild compared to the barrage of 
negative comment greeting the 2007 Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) 
Directive.59  REACH was designed to remove inconsistencies from EU rules regarding risk assessment, 
production, and use of chemicals.  It abolished the distinction between “new” and “existing” (pre-1981) 
chemicals that had been maintained in EU regulations since the mid-1980s by requiring that any chemical 
                                                 
57 Council Directive 2002/96/EC as amended by Council Directive 2003/108/EC. 
 
58 Council Directive 2002/95/EC. 
 
59Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH).  Corrected version published in February 2007 
and available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:136:0003:0280:en:PDF (accessed 20 Aug. 
2010).  
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produced in or imported to EU member states in quantities greater than 1 metric ton be included in the 
reporting and risk assessment system.  Since even the EU could not assess all chemicals simultaneously, 
the REACH Directive established a phased registration system in which the most hazardous chemicals and 
then the chemicals produced in the largest volumes would be assessed before others.  Estimates of the 
cost of this effort varied widely, with the EU Commission estimating €2.1 billion over 11 years and industry 
estimating up to €7.8 billion.  Environmentalists favor the lower figure and also maintain that most costs 
beyond the minimum estimate would be outweighed by the gain from better health and less need to clean 
up contaminated sites or manage hazardous wastes that would be inspired by the pressure from better 
informed consumers against use of hazardous chemicals.60 
 
Though segments of industry, the Bush administration in the United States, and some governments 
elsewhere strongly oppose REACH, all three Directives have shifted the global regulatory landscape.  
Chemical firms on other continents who desire to keep their European customers, or who are urged by 
consulting firms ready to provide assistance, acknowledge that they will have to comply.  Consumer groups 
have been spreading the word that consumers elsewhere need not settle for weak regulations, but should 
be using the European example to show their own governments that tighter regulation is feasible. 
 
Lessons for Scientists and Engineers 
 
Efforts to develop effective global cooperation in reducing exposure to hazardous substances and wastes 
reveal the possibilities and the limits of expert participation in transnational campaigns to affect the extent 
and terms of globally identical environmental policy.  It is clear in a field like regulation of hazardous 
chemicals and wastes that expert advice about what is and is not hazardous under what conditions is 
necessary for good policy.  Maintaining a ban on trade requires identifying what may not be traded and 
noticing it when it leaves one country or arrives in another.  Maintaining a prior informed consent system 
requires officials in states where the exporters operate, in states where the importers operate, or in states 
through which the shipments will pass, to be familiar with the chemicals or wastes, make informed 
decisions, relay them, and make sure shipments departing, arriving, or passing through contain only those 
items authorized. 
 
Professional credentials and knowledge are only part of the qualification to serve on an international expert 
committee.  The members must also have credibility vis-à-vis the national governments and other 
stakeholders involved.  Governments prefer the experts be drawn from a broadly representative group of 
countries.  This manifests an argument about “geographical representation,” with some insisting that the 
scientific advisory group should be large enough that each region of the world is represented in proportion 
to the number of countries in the region.61  Though expert committees should not get so large that they are 
unwieldy, it is important to have experts from different places because governments will listen more to 
“their” experts than to foreign ones no matter how well qualified and evenhanded the latter is.62  
                                                 
60 Henrik Selin and Stacy D. VanDeveer.  2006  “Raising global standards: Hazardous substances and e-waste management in 
the European Union,” Environment 48(10): 7-18. 
 
61 Following this suggestion means creating a committee of about 54 members.  It also means “over-representing” Africa and 
Latin America as compared to their proportions of world population. 
 
62 As Wilbert Chapman put it in 1950 when explaining the need to draw the experts from all around the hemisphere into 
assessment of tuna stocks, “we need to gain the facts in conjunction with the Latinos so they will believe them.”  Letter to the 
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However, good expert advice is not sufficient because decisions about what chemicals or wastes to define 
as hazardous and what hazardous substances to accept or reject depend on social perceptions, political 
preferences, and economic considerations as well as physical hazard.  This is recognized most explicitly in 
the LRTAP Convention process for adding other POPs to the Annexes listing regulated chemicals.  A 
government proposing to add another POP must submit a “risk profile” including three sets of information:  
 
1.) data on atmospheric transport, toxicity, persistence, and bioaccumulation,  
 
2.) data on production, uses, emissions, environmental levels in areas distant from sources, and 
environmental degradation attributable to it, and  
 
3.) alternatives to existing uses and their efficacy, adverse health or environmental effects of the 
alternatives, pollution prevention or control technology that may reduce emissions of the POP, 
and costs and benefits of shifting to the alternatives. 
 
The largest determinant of the breadth and stringency of regulations is the decisions adopted by major 
regional entities or national governments: the EU, the USA, China, India, and Japan.  These five have the 
largest markets, so are most able to trigger the possibility of “trading up” to tighter regulation to work 
because companies anxious to have access to those markets will be willing to adapt production or 
distribution practices to their requirements.63  Recent comments on WEEE, RoHS and REACH have found 
such effects.64  Yet, such dynamics can stall if the cost of complying becomes too great or if regulations 
appear to lack good grounding in documented hazards of the chemical involved. 
 
However, the hazardous wastes case shows that transnational advocacy coalitions or smaller states 
banding together can also drive global cooperation in certain directions.  Transnational groups helped 
mobilize African governments to support bans on hazardous waste shipments from industrial to developing 
states, and the governments on that continent have remained staunch supporters of the Basel Ban 
Amendment even though some developing countries elsewhere show some interest in developing 
reprocessing, recycling, or destruction industries. 
 
Both scientists and engineers figure in the process.  Some chemists develop new hazardous chemicals; 
others seek to develop benign substitutes.  Others apply their expertise to regulating chemicals while yet 
others provide expert knowledge to advocacy groups.  Some engineers design products or production 
processes that use or avoid hazardous chemicals; generate, minimize, or capture hazardous wastes; and 
make recycling or reusing harder or easier.  Others work in government regulatory agencies or waste-
handling or provide expertise to advocacy groups. 
 
Determining the right level of policy ambition requires identifying the correct substances as hazardous, 
selecting regulatory measures that address real threats in cost-effective ways, and providing sufficient 
                                                                                                                                                             
American Tuna Boat Association dated 25 August 1950, quoted in Harry N. Scheiber. 1986.  “Pacific Ocean resources, science, 
and the law of the sea,” Ecology Law Quarterly 13: 465. 
 
63 This possibility was first analyzed in David Vogel.  1995.  Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global 
Economy.  Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
64 K. Betts.  2003. “China tackles toxic electronics,” Environmental Science and Technology 1 Oct. 2003 351A; Jack Waggoner.  
2010. “New EU chemical regulations will significantly impact USA and global businesses.” Ceramic Transactions, v 211, p 71-76, 
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transparency and accountability in the policy process so that policy can be improved as new information or 
new possibilities appear.  This is not easy, and is complicated by the temptation to use “junk science” to 
underplay or to overplay the risks of using some substance, or the cost of shifting to some substitute.  
 
 
<end> 
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